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Abstract 
Insider’s intentional misbehaviours without the malicious intent to harm and security workarounds are 
emerging issues in information security behavioural field. To mitigate these insider’s threats, prior research has 
been confirming many contributing factors of misbehaviours by focusing much on the cognition of employees as 
individual beings. Consequently, these studies’ practical values are inevitably limited by the assumptions of 
their focus on individuals, which overlook the dynamic exchanges between organisational entities and 
collectives. From reviewing prior information security behavioural research and detecting their limitations, this 
paper introduces and proposes social network research as a new approach that would complement to the 
current body of knowledge. As a result, we discuss the potential directions of social network research and 
provide some potential research ideas that could be investigated using social network analysis techniques. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s organisations are prioritising their information security as they increase reliance on information systems 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Furthermore, ensuring this protection has been considered as a sophisticated task since it 
requires a combination of secured practices from all parts of the organisation–including technological, 
behavioural, managerial, philosophical and organisational aspects (Crossler et al. 2013). It is common to find the 
current knowledge body of information security research comprises of multidisciplinary perspectives (Anderson 
and Moore 2009). Within that knowledge body, contemporary literature is focusing on the socio-organisational 
resources of the companies which concern individual and organisational perspectives (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
This focus is due to two reasons. First, it has been recognised that technological controls alone are not effective 
enough to protect information security (Lee and Lee 2002). Second, academics and practitioners realised the 
users as the weakest link in information security (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Crossler et al. 2013; Dang et al. 2013). 
As a result, the information security behavioural subfield emerged and dedicated to study those socio-
organisational factors (Crossler et al. 2013; Willison and Warkentin 2013). Nevertheless, information security 
behavioural research has just recently started to focus on why insider’s misbehaviours occurred (Crossler et al. 
2013; Warkentin and Willison 2009; Willison and Warkentin 2013). In particular, this paper will be focusing on 
those information security misbehaviours that are intentionally performed by insiders without malicious intent. 
The term “insider” in information security behavioural research commonly refers to the users having access to 
the corporate information systems and knowledge of the organisational processes, which allow a wide range of 
information security behaviours including those that are disruptive, unethical or illegal (Willison and Warkentin 
2013). Despite being dwarfed by the number of studies about compliance, a number of studies has been 
investigating why people performed noncompliant misbehaviours that are either intentionally or accidentally. 
While careless mistakes could be mainly explained by ignorance, we believe the deliberate misbehaviours with 
non-malicious intent (i.e. not aiming at harming the organisation) are much complicated and deserved more 
investigations. In fact, we noticed few prior studies have defined clearly the misbehaviours to be measured or 
examined (which are rather referred to as “security violation” in general), albeit such behaviours could vary in 
nature and the findings about them could have different implications. Notable examples of those who detailed 
the misbehaviours of interest include the works of (Guo and Yuan 2012; Guo et al. 2011). For instance, Guo and 
Yuan (2012) and Guo et al. (2011) defined their non-malicious security violations as deliberate and voluntary 
rule breaking, self-benefitting without the malicious intent to harm the organisation or individuals but could 
possibly cause damage or risk. While there is a current shortage of studies dedicating to investigate these 
particular misbehaviours, emerging research showed that the nature of this type of misbehaviours is even more 
complicated. For instance, Kirlappos et al. (2014) most recently discussed the term “shadow security” which 
describes the daily workarounds that are insecure but believed otherwise by the employees as their best attempt 
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to protect the organisation’s information security while maintaining self-convenient work practices. Regardless 
of their nature being intentional violations or clumsy workarounds, these misbehaviours could appear in the 
employee’s daily tasks and hold dreadful yet hidden consequences if not receive proper attention. In fact, these 
types of misbehaviours were considered as one of the most serious insider’s works in 2010 (Guo et al. 2011). 
The global information security survey by PwC (2014) reported that the number of security incidents increased 
25% in 2013, among which 58% were believed to be performed by current (31%) or former employees (27%). 
Consistently, Verizon (2013) found an increase of more than 10% of reports regarding security breaches 
committed by insiders. In details, 14% of more than 47,000 incidents were performed deliberately by the 
internal actors (Verizon 2013). Indeed, research focusing on intentional misbehaviours with non-malicious 
intent has become even more vital to ensure information security of modern organisations.  
We observed that prior research has been studying individual’s cognition by focusing much on the individual as 
the fundamental unit of analysis while some theories such as General Deterrence Theory (Straub 1990) and 
Social Bonding Theory (Hirschi 1969) has been predominantly adopted. While we recognise the advance of 
these studies in determining the motivators and inhibitors of insider’s misbehaviours, we contend that their 
implications are inevitably subject to certain paradigm assumptions, thereby limiting our understanding of the 
reality. This invites further investigations with a different perspective and motivates the writing of this article. 
The principal method of this research is a structured literature review that helps to confirm our observation 
regarding the theories and their assumptions being predominantly adopted to study the contributing factors of 
information security misbehaviours. Consequently, we proposed the social network approach as a new direction 
to move beyond the individuals and study the dynamics between them, so to address the paradigm assumptions 
being imposed on current studies. Ultimately, we aim at answering the research question and its sub-questions: 
• RQ1: How social network approach can open up new directions for future research in information 
security behavioural field, especially about insider’s misbehaviours?  
• RQ2: What are the predominant paradigm assumptions (i.e. theoretical assumptions and fundamental 
unit of analysis) of prior studies? 
• RQ3: What is social network approach and how it contributes to the current body of knowledge? 
THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF MISBEHAVIOURS 
While we cannot claim our review is capable of covering all relevant studies, a structured approach has been 
taken to improve the rigour of our literature search (Webster and Watson 2002). Specifically, three researchers 
(i.e. the present authors) performed independent searches with relevant keywords (e.g. “antecedents AND 
information security misbehaviours”). Then, the results were gathered and analysed for common themes. The 
researchers then selected publications in leading journals and respected authors in the field to include in the 
literature review. Some examples of leading journals include Computers & Security, European Journal of 
Information Systems, Information Systems Research, Journal of Management Information Systems, and 
Information Management.  Given the research question, the objective was to determine the contributing factors 
of information security behaviours, as well as the current underlying paradigm assumptions to be questioned for 
detecting new research opportunities. As found, a majority of the existing literature about information security 
misbehaviours focuses on individual as the fundamental unit of analysis and assumes that the perpetrator 
employs a rational choice approach in their decision-making process. Specifically, they weight the expected 
benefits and costs resulting from the behaviour, and their attitude or intention to perform the behaviour will then 
be reinforced or discouraged accordingly. This assumption is based on the common adoptions of criminology 
theories which we will discuss shortly. Two distinctive groups of the motivators and inhibitors of such 
misbehaviours—the extrinsic and intrinsic factors—are identified from the current body of knowledge. 
Extrinsic Factors 
To start with, General Deterrence Theory (GDT) has been the leading theoretical background which posits that 
the facets of sanction (i.e. certainty, severity and celerity) would serve as the disincentives of deviant acts and 
therefore deter the perpetrators from performing them (Straub 1990). The discouraging effect of sanction on 
insider’s misbehaviours has been confirmed by many recent studies (e.g. Cheng et al., 2013; D’Arcy et al., 
2009; Guo et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2011), despite some discrepancy of results caused by different methodological 
approaches (D’Arcy and Herath 2011). For instance, Hu et al. (2011) did not find sanction deter illegal and 
unethical violations such as transferring product designs, hacking and selling customers’ data to competitors. As 
a result, they recommended employers to reduce the perceived benefits of violations and have better means to 
screen for employees with high moral belief and self-control, rather than relying on punishments alone. 
Similarly, Guo et al. (2011) argued upon the insignificant impact of sanction on the intentional, non-malicious 
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and self-benefitting misbehaviours that sanction’s effect was outweighed by the perceived extrinsic benefit. 
They noted that the actors in their scenarios were assumed to be aware of the policy, yet they still voluntarily 
violated it. The practical suggestion was to provide alternatives that meet both security and end-user objectives, 
rather than simply banning violations (Guo et al. 2011). In addition, they also found perceived security risks 
caused by the misbehaviours capable to discourage attitude and behavioural intention. Consequently, they 
advise security training to shift focus from IS security to business security and focus on educating the users 
about the risks of their behaviours. On the other hand, both D’Arcy et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013) 
detected sanction’s severity, but not certainty, could discourage intention to deliberately scan and look at 
confidential documents. Both studies suggested increasing the perceived severity and certainty of sanctions 
through security training program and policy as the extrinsic inhibitors of misbehaviours. However, it has also 
been supported that increased certainty of sanctions such as monitoring may violate the employee’s privacy, 
which subsequently increases internal computer abuse and antisocial behaviour (Posey, Rebecca J Bennett, et al. 
2011). Additionally, Posey et al. (2011a) adopted Causal Reasoning Theory to examine how the employee’s 
causal attribution of organisational events would affect their perceived imbalance of environment and 
subsequently deviance behaviours. The study found that when the employees find it difficult to interpret the 
increased information security measures, it would result in a lack of attributed trust and lead to increased 
computer abuses. Employers were suggested to reduce the perceived uncertainty of the employees towards the 
organisation, as well as to be aware of the possibility of excessive monitoring’s backfiring. 
In contrast, extrinsic benefits were found to encourage the employees’ attitude and intention to perform 
misbehaviours when the rational evaluation approach is taken. For example, Hu et al. (2011) detected that 
having low self-control could result in realising more the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits, therefore encouraged 
intention to commit computer misconduct. Interestingly, they detected that the extrinsic and materialistic gains 
displayed weaker impact on intention to commit abuses than the intrinsic, emotional gains such as excitement 
and thrill. Moreover, Guo et al. (2011) found job performance’s advantage has positive impacts on both attitude 
and intention to perform misbehaviours. They interpreted such perceived advantage could be a desirable goal 
that the users would use misbehaviours as a legitimate mean to achieve such goal (Guo et al. 2011). 
Intrinsic Factors 
The most common intrinsic factors include the employee’s own moral beliefs and the desire for social approval 
from the subjective norms of their peers. It is also worth noticing that subjective norms could serve as either a 
motivator or inhibitor of attitude/intention to perform misbehaviours. In one context, subjective norms was 
found to have positive influence on the employee’s antisocial actions in the way that individuals with low 
computer/security expertise perceived compliance as irrelevant to their job and delegated security decision-
making to supervisors or co-workers (Guo et al. 2011). They argued that the process in which workgroup norm 
affects employee’s attitude was independent from their cost-benefit evaluation (i.e. job performance and security 
risks). Moreover, the employee was asserted to not even judge the morality of the misbehaviours as long as their 
actions are consistent with the norms (Guo et al. 2011). As a result, the research suggested training “power 
users” to serve as role models for other employees and increase overall security awareness. Consistently, 
research by Lee et al. (2004) detected positive impacts of involvement and norm on insider’s abuse. In this case, 
a norm that advocates misbehaviours would serve as a motivator of the employee’s attitude and intention to 
perform such behaviours. 
On the other hand, Lee and Lee (2002) hypothesised that attachment, involvement, commitment and belief could 
influence the employee’s attitude towards computer abuse, then subsequently affect behavioural intention. Their 
hypothesised model was also based on Social Bonding Theory (Hirschi 1969) in criminology, which assumed 
people as rational beings that have the tendency to commit crimes if low social control (consists of the four 
mentioned factors) failed to prevent them. In this sense, positive attitude towards misbehaviours is discouraged 
by the expected harms on co-workers (high attachment), concern of negating previous work efforts (high 
commitment) and moral belief about computer abuses as illegal acts (Lee and Lee 2002). Cheng et al. (2013) 
tested these hypotheses and found the discouraging effects of attachment, commitment, belief in conventional 
value system and subjective norms on intention to perform misbehaviours. Employers were further advised to 
improve the employees’ attachment to their job and organisation as well as their loyalty to prevent abuses.  
Regarding one’s own moral belief, D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that moral commitment played a significant role 
in their model in influencing the individual’s intention to perform misuses and controlling the effects of 
sanctions. Furthermore, moral commitment’s discouraging effect was even stronger than sanction (D’Arcy et al. 
2009). However, they contended that moral commitment would have less value in practice due to its variation 
depending on the individuals and therefore being difficult to control by organisations. More important, moral 
beliefs and social costs such as expected shame and guilt were introduced by D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) in the 
form of informal sanctions (tested as social desirability), along with virtual status and employment level, as a 
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theoretical advance of GDT. The study found informal sanctions to have strong influences in discouraging 
technology misuse intention, while virtual status slightly impacted the intention. It is also interesting to observe 
the insignificant effect of employment level, therefore assumed that both managers and non-managers staff 
would likely to have similar misuse intention (D’Arcy et al. 2009). However, they recognised that such 
insignificant result might be due to the lack of managers participated in the survey. In addition, perceived 
identity match was found to effectively discourage intention to perform misbehaviours both directly and 
indirectly mediated by attitude (Guo et al. 2011). It was interpreted that employees may refrain from the 
behavioural intention if the misbehaviours are perceived to contrast their professionalism, thus produces 
unfavourable attitude towards such behaviours. 
Next Directions in Information Security Behavioural Research About Misbehaviours 
Notably, there are two new research directions emerged from the field and received attention recently. First, 
there was a shift from examining individual and organisational factors as two separated entities to emphasising 
their interaction, suggested mostly by qualitative studies that investigated in-depth how the employees perceive 
the security controls. Perhaps one of the earliest studies which discussed such interaction between the 
employees and their environment was by Willison and Backhouse (2006). The study incorporated five 
criminology theories to advance a framework explaining how motivated offenders would find opportunities to 
perform abuses by gaining information from their routine activity and assessing the environment’s controls. In 
this sense, the framework elaborates the dishonest employees’ perspective in viewing and exploiting the systems 
risks caused by inadequate guardianship by security controls (Willison and Backhouse 2006). As a result, this 
research describes how a regular employee in specific circumstances perceives the attributes of the 
opportunity’s structure, then exploits them and transforms into an offender.  
Second, in line with this research direction was the extension of the seminal Security Cycle Action (SCA) 
(Straub and Welke 1998) by Willison and Warkentin (2013) to cover the employee-workplace interaction. By 
moving beyond the deterrence point of the SCA, they suggested that poor interaction between the employees 
and their workplace would produce disgruntlement, organisational injustice and motives as “pre-kinetic” events 
that reinforce behavioural intention to abuse. The importance of negative emotions in affecting insiders’ 
misbehaviours was also emphasised. For instance, Baskerville et al. (2014) proposed an alternative of the 
framework discussed previously by Willison and Backhouse (2006), which consists of the emotion process 
involving appraisal of arousal, affect and action readiness. The modified framework also elaborated the 
regulation (internal and external) process, the offender’s concerns about relevant events that trigger negative 
emotions, as well as the action availability according to the organisation’s liberty (i.e. freedom of movement) 
and physical environment. Most recently, Dang (2014) proposed a conceptual model describing the contributing 
effects of work strains on the employees’ perceived organisational injustice, which subsequently results in anger 
and reinforces the insider’s abuses. 
In summary, the discussed literature so far has made clear that the positive attitude towards misbehaviours and 
their behavioural intention receive influences from a range of organisational and individual factors. In details, 
the perpetrators were asserted to be motivated by materialistic gains such as job performance (Guo et al. 2011; 
Hu et al. 2011), or negative emotions which result in expressive actions (Baskerville et al. 2014; Dang 2014; 
Posey, Rebecca J Bennett, et al. 2011; Willison and Warkentin 2013), or they just simply want to follow the 
norms that encourage the misbehaviours (Cheng et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2004). In some cases, the motivated 
offenders evaluate the situations to find their opportunities and act accordingly (Baskerville et al. 2014; Willison 
and Backhouse 2006). In turn, security managers could use the sanction’s effects of formal controls to deter 
misbehaviours (Cheng et al., 2013; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Guo et al., 2011; Hu et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2004), 
which at the same time could be harmful by creating even more security risks if perceived as excessive by the 
employees. The only disincentive that has been consistently found effective was the individual’s moral belief 
(D’Arcy and Devaraj 2012; D’Arcy et al. 2009) that discourages the misbehaviours. Nevertheless, personal 
moral belief was suggested to vary among individuals and organisations may find it difficult to shape varied 
beliefs, therefore holds little practical values. 
CURRENT GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A NEW APPROACH 
Other Than “Bad Apples” & “Bad Barrels”–The Patterns and Dynamics in Between 
There was a seminal article about unethical organisational behaviours by Brass et al. (1998) which described the 
individuals as “apples” inside their “barrels” i.e. organisation. This article presented two points of view 
regarding the cause of unethical organisational behaviours: whether it was due to the “rotten apples” that spoil 
the barrels (individual’s attributes that influence organisational unethical behaviours), or it was the “bad barrels” 
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that damage the apples within (organisation’s culture and norms that promote unethical behaviours). 
Nevertheless, this dichotomy of bad apples and bad barrels have been abandoned by researchers since its 
approach was unable to capture the complexity of the interaction between the individuals and their organisations 
when it comes to making unethical or ethical decisions (Brass et al. 1998). Come back to the information 
security issues of intentional violations and harmful workarounds, it could be observed that a majority of the 
prior research reviewed in this article has been focusing much on the “apples” and the remaining few briefly 
addressed the role of the “barrels”. While their finding provided a wealth of knowledge about what does and 
does not influence misbehaviours, these studies have certain assumptions and gaps that we found interesting to 
develop knowledge upon. 
For instance, the major extrinsic inhibitor of misbehaviours, sanction, has its formal deterrent effect depends on 
the dissemination of information security policy. Accordingly, General Deterrence Theory assumes the 
perpetrators are aware of and respond to the punishment associated with effect policing (Straub 1990). As a 
result, it could be argued that the confirmed findings about the effects of sanctions are subject to the policy 
being known. Nevertheless, information security policy is hardly read or referred to by the employees (Wood 
2000), not to mention that a security policy may not even be formally available in some organisations. Likewise, 
we contend that the poor dissemination of information and knowledge may also occur in how subjective norms 
and social bonding are realised and perceived by the employees. For instance, there could be solitary individuals 
or groups, due to constraints or deliberate refusal to participate, that do not receive any influences from any 
social or political influences, thereby rendering the effects of norms and bonding ineffective. 
More importantly, recent studies have shown that security are collective information practices of risk, trust and 
morality (Dourish and Anderson 2006). It was emphasised that the individuals’ different perceptions of risk 
should be examined “relative to social structure” and they interpret risk according to their positions in such 
structures (Dourish and Anderson 2006 p. 330). Similarly, the workarounds or “shadow security” behaviours 
also resulted from the employees’ interpretations of risks that are different from the security managers’ 
expectations (Kirlappos et al. 2014). On the other hands, trust and morality are also factors that have been 
included in information security behavioural studies. In particular, Kirlappos et al. (2013) argued that centralised 
policy may not fit with local and situational events that demand greater flexibility to cope with information 
security risks, thereby suggesting the employees to be trusted in making own decisions to mitigate the perceived 
risks. Interestingly, it was found that the employees tend to delegate their responsibility when making 
information security decisions, and trust is a form of investment required by the different kinds of delegation 
(Dourish et al. 2004). More specifically, they found that the employees delegated security to technologies, 
knowledgeable acquaintances, organisations or institutions that they believe as trustworthy. Moreover, the 
delegated individuals are even referred to as the guarantor of the security responsibility even if they leave the 
scene (Dourish et al. 2004). Similarly, Kirlappos et al. (2014) also reported this group-based decision making 
process when investigating how “shadow security” behaviours were created and performed within workgroups. 
Those findings inspired the research idea that focuses on the holistic social structure that transmits information 
relating to information security within the organisation, to be used by employees with attributes and decisions 
relational to relevant entities such as work groups, policies and technologies. Such idea is similar to but also 
different from the next direction of information security behavioural research that we discussed previously. On 
one hand, Willison and Warkentin (2013) suggested studying the impacts of factors created by the workplace-
employee’s interaction on individuals’ misbehaviours. Consequently, potential knowledge generated from this 
direction would contribute to the current understanding about the bad apples’ cognitions and behaviours as 
individual beings. On the other hand, we propose to examine the patterns of the relationships and the 
interactional activities between the “apples”, and how the individual or collective information security decisions 
would be influenced by these patterns and activities. Based on the recent findings presented previously about 
intentional misbehaviours without malicious intent and “shadow security”/workarounds, we found that risk, 
trust, responsibility, morality, as well as artefacts such as policy and security controls hold crucial influences on 
such misbehaviours. More importantly, they could be created, interpreted, shared and delegated by the 
employees among organisational collectives, thereby influencing information security decisions. As a 
consequence, we suggest the potential social network research approach in information security behavioural 
field and particularly how social network analysis can be a useful method to study the mentioned aspects. 
A Brief Introduction About Social Network Research Approach 
By adopting the social network research approach, researchers shift their attention away from the individuals 
and aim at generating knowledge that are more relational, contextual and systemic (Borgatti and Foster 2003). 
Supporting this research approach is the use of social network analysis (SNA) as a research method for 
capturing and measuring the features of networks’ social structure. SNA has been increasingly applied in 
management and organisational studies to investigate the beliefs and behaviours of people as interconnected 
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beings that are influenced by the relationships patterns among them within the organisational and social systems 
(Zack 2000). In contrast, as far as we know there has been only the recent work of Yoo and Lawrence Sanders 
(2013) in information security behavioural field that used SNA to explore security compliance at group level. 
Similarly, in the coming paragraphs we will propose ideas based on the major streams of social network 
research in organisational and management studies, rather than provide a technical how-to guide, so to exploit 
the rich applications of SNA and extend this new research direction in information security behavioural field. 
Among the literature reviews on doing social network research, we found the recent work by Carpenter et al. 
(2012) very useful in providing a comprehensive and systematic guide. Specifically, they identified two main 
schemes of social network research namely “social capital” and “network development”, which both aim at 
studying interpersonal (i.e. actors are people) and inter-organisational (i.e. actors are firms or their 
representatives) levels. In our context of employees’ information security misbehaviours, investigations at the 
interpersonal level would be most fitting. 
The schemes of research is categorised according to the social network’s role and the research’s objectives 
(Carpenter et al. 2012). On one hand, social capital research is interested in analysing the networks as causes or 
predictors of their consequences (on node- or group-level). In details, social capital is referred to as the utility 
and benefits that the participants receive from the networks such as power and influence, access to resources, 
increased performance and creativity, and such social capital could be achieved by “network application” and 
“network structure” (Carpenter et al. 2012). The network application construct measures how effectively the 
actors can use the resources flowing through their possessed ties to influence the different outcomes, whereas 
network structure analyses the structural patterns and features of the actors’ participated networks, so to 
determine the influences on the received social capital. On the other hand, network development research 
concerned with the changes and evolution of networks’ formation due to two major forces, including ongoing 
network structure’s opportunities and intentional shaping by organisation’s inducements (Carpenter et al. 2012). 
For instance, network structure predictors can be the basic features of networks such as ties, triads and nodes 
that result in the routines of how networks change, as in how new ties could emerge between firms and their 
former partners, or a weak tie could break down a triad of acquaintances which it belongs to (Carpenter et al. 
2012). Besides the routine transformations of network according to its current features, actors can also purposely 
shape the networks via homophily and instrumentality. Homophily describes the situation when people tend to 
connect with those of similar attributes, thus demonstrates that network structure can be influenced by active 
matching of demographics, personalities or jobs’ natures. Instrumentality refers to the actors’ perceived values 
of the networks, influenced by their demands and resources available. Consequently, non-network precursors 
such as resource demands, environmental pressures and reputation have been examined for their predicting 
effects on social networks by prior research (Carpenter et al. 2012). The research schemes and their respective 
predictors/predicted consequences can be summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Social network research at interpersonal level (adapted from Carpenter et al., 2012) 
Schemes Predictors Predicted consequences 
Social capital 
research 
Network application: utilisation of flowing resources. 
Network structure: patterns and features of actor’s social 
networks. 
Social capital benefits (e.g. 
power, influence, access to 
resources, performance etc.). 
Network 
development 
research 
Opportunities/network structure: nodes and network level, 
less dyadic level. 
Actor’s purposeful inducements/non-network constructs: 
homophily and instrumentality (values of networks 
determined by actors’ demands). 
Network structure: nodes and 
network level, less dyadic 
level. 
Network application: mainly 
network possession. 
Applying Social Network Research in Information Security Behavioural Field 
Social network research can be “applied” or “basic”, and each direction has its own analysis goal (Borgatti et al. 
2013). Accordingly, applied social network research aims at calculating the metrics that reflect the networks’ 
structure, which can be interpreted by network analysts so to devise appropriate follow-up actions. Some 
examples of these applied studies include identifying key persons by their centrality in the network to leverage 
diffusion of innovative practices to these individuals, or to determine the isolated employees in the firm and 
provide interventions so that they can be more connected. In harmony with the applied type is the basic research 
which aims at understanding the causal process between the predicting conditions and their subsequent 
outcomes. In other words, basic social network research confirmed the causal phenomena so that the applied 
ones can base on such to make effective decisions given the networks at hands. Borgatti et al. (2013, p. 6) 
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described two types of theories that basic social network research seeks including “network theories of __” and 
“__ theories of networks”, whereas the researchers can fill in the blanks with their variables of interest. More 
specifically, researchers can measure the features of the actors’ position in the network and use those features to 
predict, for example, their political influence within the firm. As a consequence, this would result in the 
“network theory of political influence”. On the other hand, there is the case when an independent variable such 
as political views could be used to predict how people having the common opinions would become each other’s 
friends. This in turn leads to the “common political views theory of network tie formulation”. While the 
categorisation in Table 1 provides a brief yet systematic understanding about social network research’s 
capabilities, the discussed analysis goals further shape our ideas of how to apply SNA to address information 
security behavioural research questions. In the coming paragraphs, we will discuss some potential research ideas 
about information security misbehaviours that fall into the categories of applied and basic social network 
research, particularly the uses of network variables as predictors of security-related factors. The stream of basic 
research that uses network variables as predicted outcomes is not included in our discussions because their 
theoretical contributions focus more on network areas, therefore being out of this paper’s scope which is 
information security misbehaviours.  
Applied social network research 
If the spread of misbehaviours or workarounds among individuals was a confirmed phenomenon, it would be 
desirable to investigate where it starts and which routes allow or accelerate the spreading process so that 
interventions can be made. One possible approach, which has been done quite commonly in information security 
behavioural field, is to provide the participants vignettes of security violations and measure their behavioural 
intention. At the same time, researchers can build sociogram that describes advice networks of the employees, 
especially when they seek each other for information security-related advice or induction, as mentioned in the 
study of Kirlappos et al. (2014). By combining these data, it would be possible to trace back the key 
employees/sources that spread the misbeliefs about information security. Furthermore, quasi-experiment 
research can also be conducted to monitor how interventions would change the networks’ features as well as the 
individuals’ characteristics. For instance, by knowing the sources of information security behaviours and their 
influential networks, security managers can conduct targeted-trainings aiming at those individuals with the hope 
that they would disseminate the recommended practices, and then generate another sociogram after a while to 
measure the changes and assess their effectiveness. 
Basic social network research 
Prior and current research has confirmed many contributing factors that influence behavioural intention and 
attitude towards information security misbehaviours, and we expect that studying the networks’ features as 
predictors of those factors would bring complementary values. For instance, formal and informal sanctions have 
been consistently found to produce discouraging effect on intention to perform misbehaviours, but its 
effectiveness is tied to the assumption that the sanctions are recognised by the employees. By using SNA, it 
could reveal how formulations and characteristics of ties and nodes’ positions would contribute to the evenly 
distributed awareness about sanctions, therefore improves their practical applications. Similarly, this approach 
can also be applied to other important inhibitors and motivators of misbehaviours introduced previously such as 
subjective norms, social bonding, and intrinsic and extrinsic benefits.  
Moreover, employees were found to make information security decisions based on their interpretations of risks 
and delegate security to other entities based on their trustworthiness (Dourish and Anderson 2006; Dourish et al. 
2004). In addition, work groups and teams develop their own security micro-cultures that mediate and permit 
misbehaviours to happen (Kirlappos et al. 2014). Conveniently, such joint actions and collaborative processes 
are the main analysis targets of SNA techniques, especially via studying bridging and bonding ties. While 
bridging ties allow access to resources and link different subgroups within a network together, bonding ties play 
crucial roles in fostering trust and reciprocity within the groups, thereby making them more cohesive (Bodin and 
Crona 2009). In this case, adopting SNA to measure the levels of trust investment between the employees and 
their reachability to relevant resources (e.g. peers, technologies, prescribed procedures and solutions) would 
yield interesting findings. For example, we could test the relationships between networks’ structure and security 
decisions to answer questions e.g. would individuals possessing many connections receive more security 
delegations since they are more reachable, and whether high centrality would result in trust investment as well? 
Furthermore, we can also identify the key entities in the security decision-making process by looking at the 
attributes and answering questions e.g. what are the common attributes of trustworthy entities that individuals 
seek security advice from or delegate their security to? This would allow exploitation of these key entities’ 
influences or removal of the root causes of misbehaviours. 
It needs to be emphasised that SNA techniques are versatile and have many metrics which can be used to study 
the impacts of networks’ dynamics and structural features on misbehaviours, while we have just discussed a 
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modest amount of potential research directions and applications. More importantly, the suggested social network 
approaches (i.e. applied and basic; social capital and network development) are not only closely related to each 
other but also to prior research in information security behavioural field, particularly in terms of complimenting 
each other with research findings. The links between social network research directions and prior research, as 
well as between the multiple directions within the social network approach, are discussed throughout our study 
and illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: The links between social network approach (including its directions) and prior research 
It is crucial to acknowledge the difficulties of conducting social network research. Since the findings are derived 
from the networks and their nodes, they could be affected by omission errors as a result of poor data collection 
(Borgatti et al. 2013). In analysing the networks, these authors warn edge/node attribution errors can mislead 
interpretations of network data (e.g. assume connection between two students by observing them attend the 
same classes, but in fact they do not hang out together), and suggest triangulation of other relational data. 
Finally, interviewee’s burden while answering social network questionnaire must be considered, especially 
when the questions are intrusive (e.g. name specific people and rank their importance), exhaustive (e.g. pick five 
out of 500 employees as the most approachable ones), or prone to retrospective error (e.g. who did you interact 
with in the company’s dinner last night) (Borgatti et al. 2013). While the holistic focus of this approach which 
tends to emphasise more on the network’s surface could be complemented by existing research that studied in-
depth each individual of the network, the discussed difficulties and the method’s technical nature could be the 
main reasons that limit the choice of using this approach in information security behavioural field. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been widely recognised that information security threats coming from inside of the firms are equivalently 
devastating to, if not even greater than, external attacks since the perpetrators have the necessary knowledge and 
rightful access to the organisational systems (Dang 2014). Worse still, misbehaviours without the malicious 
intent to harm or clumsy workarounds caused by information security misbeliefs are quite common and can be 
spread stealthy within the workplace (Kirlappos et al. 2014). Prior and current research has been producing a 
great wealth of knowledge regarding the contributing factors of those misbehaviours while focusing much on 
the cognition of employees as individual beings. However, findings from the current theory-testing approach 
have their practical values inevitably limited by the theories’ assumptions which overlook the dynamic 
interaction between organisational entities and collectives in the reality.  
As a consequence, we propose a set of social network research directions as a promising approach for future 
studies in information security behavioural field. In particular, employing social network analysis techniques 
allows researchers to explore further the relationships between the confirmed contributing factors of 
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misbehaviours and the organisational/individual networks, including the networks’ structural features as well as 
the dynamics of exchange activities between organisational entities. We believe the social network approach not 
only complements the current understanding about information security misbehaviours but also produces new 
knowledge in aspects such as dissemination of information security policy, measuring discrepancy of security 
goals and expectations, formation and transformation of security climates and sub-cultures, just to name a few. 
This paper aims to be one of the firsts that advocates the adoption of social network analysis techniques in 
information security behavioural field, and we look forward to seeing interesting findings emerge from future 
research following this approach. 
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